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HONG KONG AND CHINA IN 1997: AN
EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED
STATES BUSINESSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the best example of [free trade] is Hong Kong....
Hong Kong has no tariffs or other restraints on interna-
tional trade .... It has no government direction of eco-
nomic activity, no minimum wage laws, no fixing of prices.
The residents are free to buy from whom they want, to sell
to whom they want, to hire whom they want, to work for
whom they want.'
As trade in Asia booms, the world increasingly turns to
the Pacific Rim as a source of investment and trade growth.2
While many rapid changes are taking place in the Asian
economies, concern about the fate of Hong Kong, long called
the "Pearl of the Orient" because of its strategic location, bur-
geoning trade, and luxurious lifestyle, increases as 1997
grows closer.3 As Great Britain and China agreed in the 1984
Joint Declaration, 4 Hong Kong will cede to China in 1997 af-
ter ninety-nine years of British rule.5 In addition to the dis-
appearance of British rule, the security of having Hong Kong
as a trading partner governed by common law and free trade
policies has begun to dissipate, and uncertainties regarding
international agreements and trade policies have surfaced.
6
Many questions and concerns for American businesses have
therefore arisen.
1. University of Hong Kong Law Professor Peter Rhodes, Address at the
University of Hong Kong (June 20, 1994) (quoting Milton Freidman).
2. Bill Saporito, The World's Best Cities for Business, FORTUNE, Nov. 14,
1994, at 113.
3. Id.
4. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong [hereinafter Joint Declaration], Sept. 26,
1984, U.K-P.R.C.
5. IAN KELLY, HONG KONG: A POLITIcAL-GEoGRAPHIc ANALYsIs 38 (1986).
6. Eric Ellis, Hong Kong: Economists Forecast Gloom in 1997, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Mar. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
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Hong Kong is currently one of the major trade centers of
the world, and its strategic location makes it a vital center for
future trade in Asia.7 As foreign investment increases, and
as the United States uses Hong Kong as the pivotal port into
the rest of Asia and the emerging Chinese market, its stabil-
ity as a trade center becomes an important issue." Hong
Kong "offers unique access to the planet's fastest-growing
economy and biggest potential market, China."9 Adding to
the complexity of the post-1997 trade problem is Hong Kong's
ascension to membership in the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (hereinafter GATT) in April 1986,10 and China's
current inability to gain membership status."
The big question is: what will happen in 1997?12
Whatever does happen will heavily influence how the United
States continues to do business in both Hong Kong and
China. American businesses presently entering into con-
tracts with Hong Kong enjoy the benefits of consistent adjudi-
cation of disputes and enforcement of judgments under Brit-
ish law.'" The year 1997 brings with it not only a completely
untested body of law with which the United States must con-
tend, but also its interaction with the laws of the country that
governs it. 14 Upon close examination, this law in effect dele-
gates to China the authority to make a final decision with
7. Saporito, supra note 2, at 113.
8. In fact, Fortune magazine recently rated Hong Kong the top city in
which to do business. Id. It cited its few tariffs, dynamic location, and remark-
able ability to balance its budget as reasons for this distinction. Id. In addition,
it deemed Hong Kong as the gateway to trade for most major Asian cities. Id.
9. Id.
10. See discussion infra part II.E.2.
11. See discussion infra part II.E.3.
12. Santa Clara University School of Law Professor Anna Han explores the
possible problems associated with the Joint Declaration in conjunction with
Chinese law and policy. Anna Han, Hong Kong's Basic Law: The Path to 1997,
Paved with Pitfalls, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 321 (1993). Professor
Han's analysis suggests that Hong Kong may not be able to maintain its inde-
pendence as an economic decision maker. Id. at 322. Since Hong Kong's foreign
affairs will be decided in accordance with Chinese Basic Law, it is likely that
"Hong Kong's interest will probably be subverted." Id. at 341.
13. See infra notes 68-69.
14. THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [hereinafter BASIC LAw] (effective July 1,
1997) (P.R.C.). Although the United States presently trades with China and is
familiar with its trade laws, Basic Law is more problematic because it actually
represents an integration of Chinese law and common law - ideas which are
quite contradictory. See discussion infra parts IV.A.1, IV.C.
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respect to virtually every issue China deems important to up-
hold the Chinese Constitution.
15
If Hong Kong is to remain autonomous, why is China so
important in this discussion? Evidence already exists that
China's political and economic environment heavily influence
confidence in Hong Kong markets.
16
This comment examines the dynamics of interaction be-
tween Hong Kong and China that can affect American busi-
nesses currently investing in Hong Kong, or those businesses
that are about to embark on a venture in Hong Kong.17 This
comment seeks to elicit possible problems that United States
businesses may encounter in post-1997 trade with Hong
Kong,18 and to offer proposals regarding how the United
States can safeguard its business interests.' 9 As a final per-
spective, this comment will discuss Hong Kong's role in the
trade market as a member of the newly created World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO.], which seeks to strengthen
enforcement of GATT judgments. 20
15. The Joint Declaration provides that Hong Kong SAR "shall maintain
the economic and trade systems previously practiced in Hong Kong [and] decide
its economic and trade policies on its own." Joint Declaration, supra note 4,
annex I, VI. For purposes of clarity, Hong Kong prior to 1997 will be denoted
"Hong Kong" and post-1997 Hong Kong will be denoted "Hong Kong SAR." The
Joint Declaration also explicitly provides that the Central People's Government
will have the final say on international agreements. Joint Declaration, supra
note 4, annex I, XI. These laws conflict. See discussion infra part V.A.
16. Weighing Hong Kong's Future, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1992, at 84. For ex-
ample, foreign investment in manufacturing rose only 14% from 1989 to 1990,
while in previous years it showed an average increase of 24%. Id. In addition,
production leveled off from 1989 to 1990. Id. Even tourism dropped by 4.1%
from 1989 to 1990. Hong Kong Country Profile, Walden Publishing, Jan. 20,
1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Profil File. The following year, it
rose again. Id.
A current example is the pending United States trade war with China, in
which Hong Kong urged the United States to "take into account others who will
suffer if trade sanctions are carried out." Hong Kong Officials Concerned Over
Growing U.S.-China Tensions, Daily Report for Executives, Feb. 8, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Curnws File. Hong Kong estimated that trade
sanctions against China would cost Hong Kong $470 million in annual lost re-
export trade, and could potentially affect up to 4000 jobs. Id. Hong Kong's
greatest fears lay in the "long term fallout from reduced investor confidence" if
the United States and China fail to settle this latest trade dispute. Id.
17. This comment will also address the United States-China trade relation-
ship because, as will be discussed below, this aspect of the interaction is rele-
vant to the United States' dealings with Hong Kong.
18. See discussion infra part IV.
19. See discussion infra part V.
20. See discussion infra part IV.E.1.
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In order to set the stage for discussion of the problems
that may confront the United States and Hong Kong in busi-
ness, part II first explains how Hong Kong will theoretically
function post-1997 according to both the Joint Declaration,21
which establishes Hong Kong's return to Chinese sover-
eignty, and the Basic Law, which will govern the scope and
power of Hong Kong's judicial, executive, and legislative bod-
ies. This comment then examines China's legal system
with respect to legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, and
political overtones. 23 A brief discussion of GATT and its dis-
pute resolution process offers an additional perspective on
the interaction difficulties. 21 Part IV analyzes the complica-
tions United States businesses may encounter on account of
these factors.2 5 Finally, in part V, several proposals are
made regarding how the United States may prepare for 1997
in the face of the unpredictability and uncertainty that sur-
round the relationship between Hong Kong and China.26
A theme recurring throughout this comment is the para-
doxical nature of China's socialist government, its drive to as-
cend to a free market economy, and its desire to maintain
Hong Kong as the model of free trade.27
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Hong Kong and Its Return to Chinese
Sovereignty
On June 30, 1997, Hong Kong will become a special ad-
ministrative region (hereinafter SAR) of China.28 By deem-
ing the region a SAR, China and Hong Kong hope to retain
21. See discussion infra part II.B.
22. See discussion infra part II.C.
23. See discussion infra part II.D.
24. See discussion infra part II.E.
25. See discussion infra part IV.
26. See discussion infra part V.
27. Note that the ensuing discussion is not limited to the possible conflicts
which may occur in 1997. Rather, this is merely the beginning point for the
discussion. This comment examines the implications that may exist on Ameri-
can businesses in light of the potential 1997 conflicts and how these conflicts
may be resolved. In addition, politics surrounding China's nonmembership sta-
tus in GATT is a crucial issue that influences the trade relationship. See dis-
cussion infra part V.D.2.
28. Joint Declaration, supra note 4, art. I.
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Hong Kong's free market economy and independent system of
justice under China's sovereignty.29
Great Britain's occupation of present-day Hong Kong in-
volves three separate geographical areas.3 0 Hong Kong Is-
land ceded to the British in 1842, the Kowloon Peninsula to
the British in 1860, and the New Territories were leased to
Great Britain by China for ninety-nine years in 1898.31
Thus, the New Territories were essentially the subject of con-
troversy between the two countries.3 2
Great Britain did not broach the subject of the 1997
"deadline" until 1982, when it became apparent that Britain
faced fifteen year land lease renewals on Hong Kong prop-
erty. This mortgage period indicated that Britain would
have to begin thinking about negotiating with China regard-
ing Hong Kong's future. 4
Britain originally approached negotiations with China
from the position that, because Great Britain had occupied
the territory for such a significant period of time, the New
Territories, in effect, had implicitly ceded to Great Britain
along with Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula.3
China did not agree with this view.3 6 It claimed that the
"British had no basis for its claims" because the New Territo-
ries were only leased to Great Britain. The lease itself best
demonstrates the reality of China's assertion.38 Great Brit-
ain effectively had no choice in the decision because the rest
of Hong Kong could not survive without it. 9 Thus, negotia-
tions regarding the method of Hong Kong's return to Chinese
sovereignty commenced between Great Britain and China in
1982.40
29. Id. pmbl.
30. KELLY, supra note 5, at 37.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. A Draft Agreement Between the People's Republic of China-United
Kingdom: Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M.
1366, 1367 (1984).
34. Id.
35. KELLY, supra note 5, at 97.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 97. The New Territories is home to 92% of the population, so
losing this territory would effectively destroy Hong Kong. Id.
40. Id.
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The result of over two years of negotiations was the Joint
Declaration. 4'
B. The 1984 Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration was signed in September 198442
and ratified in 1985. 43 The document itself provides no
source of law. 44 Rather, it serves as the framework for poli-
cies within which China and Hong Kong will interact begin-
ning June 30, 1997, and continue to do so for at least fifty
years, until 2047. 45
The Joint Declaration denotes the "one country-two sys-
tems" concept upon which China based Basic Law.46 "One
country-two systems" means that Hong Kong can maintain
its capitalist scheme as a separate administrative region,
although its sovereign power, China, continues to operate
under a socialist system.47
Following the ratification of the Joint Declaration, the
Basic Law Drafting Committee was established to create the
law under which China would allow Hong Kong to function
under the principles of the Joint Declaration.48 Though both
Britain and China have ratified the Joint Declaration, many
issues still remain unresolved.49
C. Hong Kong Basic Law
The Joint Declaration will be implemented by what is
called Basic Law.50 Basic Law can best be explained as a
"mini-constitution defining the respective authorities of the
Central Government in Beijing and the Hong Kong SAR gov-
41. Id.
42. HUNGDAH CHrU, THE DRAFT BASIC LAW OF HONG KONG: ANALYSIS AND
DOCUMENTS 1 (1988).
43. Id.
44. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 43 (Jurgen
Domes & Yu-Ming Shaw eds., 1988).
45. Id. at 43.
46. See discussion infra part II.C.
47. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 54.
48. Id. at 55.
49. See discussion infra parts IV.A, IV.B. The Joint Declaration provided
for the formation of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group [hereinafter SJLG] to
handle unresolved issues prior to 1997. Joint Declaration, supra note 4, annex
II. The SJLG has no actual power. Rather, it functions as a liaison between the
two governments. Id.
50. BASIC LAW, supra note 14, pmbl.
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ernment, the political system of the Hong Kong SAR and the
rights and obligations of Chinese citizens in the Hong Kong
SAR."5 1 A discussion of the relevant portions follows.
Basic Law essentially allows Hong Kong to continue to
operate with a "high degree of autonomy,"5 2 except in the ar-
eas of foreign affairs53 and defense. 54 The provision with
which this comment is most concerned is article 5, which
states that "[tihe socialist system and policies [of China] shall
not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, and the previous capitalist system as a way of life shall
remain unchanged for 50 years. "55 Basic Law spells out the
framework for how this system will function in the face of
China's socialist system.56 Basic Law provides for a free
trade policy, which encompasses a continuing free movement
of goods, intangible assets, and capital,57 no restrictions on
foreign exchange of currency, including keeping Hong Kong's
present currency,58 and the sustainment of land rights, such
as ownership and extension of leases, past 1997. 89
Basic Law also contains a blanket provision that the
Hong Kong SAR Government "shall provide an appropriate
economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the
status of Hong Kong as an international financial center."60
Article 109 is supported by provisions that establish author-
ity for continuing operation of private shipping lines6 1 and
private aviation services 62 in order to facilitate the free move-
ment of goods and continue Hong Kong's free port status.63
In addition, key provisions are designed to preserve Hong
Kong's autonomy in international trade circles, such as in-
dependent membership in GATT,64 and the ability to inde-
pendently negotiate its own trade agreements.65
51. CHIU, supra note 42, at 8.
52. BASIc LAW, supra note 14, art. 2.
53. Id. art. 13.
54. Id. art. 14.
55. Id. art. 5.
56. JUDITH SIHOMBING, ANNUAL SURVEY OF THE LAW 185 (1992).
57. BAsic LAW, supra note 14, art. 115.
58. Id. art. 112.
59. Id. arts. 120-121.
60. Id. art. 109.
61. Id. art. 127.
62. Id. art. 135.
63. Id. art. 114.
64. Id. art. 116. See discussion infra part II.E.
65. BASIc LAw, supra note 14, art. 116.
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Present Hong Kong law, based on the British common
law system, will remain the law of the Hong Kong SAR.66
Current sources of law include statutes, common law, Chi-
nese customs, and British legislation.67
Notwithstanding the specificity of Basic Law regarding
China's desire to keep Hong Kong in its present state, all of
the above provisions are subject to article 8, which states that
all pre-1997 laws will become the law of Hong Kong SAR un-
less they "contravene Basic Law."68 Thus, all the policies
that the Basic Law protects are subject to review in Beijing in
the event China decides that a law contravenes the Basic
Law.69
Basic Law also includes a bill of rights, aimed at protect-
ing rights and freedoms presently enjoyed by the people of
Hong Kong.70 Thus, in theory, freedom of speech, press, as-
sembly, and other fundamental rights will be preserved.7 1
However, Basic Law does alter the structure of the Hong
Kong SAR Government with respect to the three bodies of
power.
1. The Executive Branch
Hong Kong will continue to function as an executive-led
system. 72 A Chief Executive73 will be appointed by the Chi-
nese Central People's Government,74 and will be responsible
to the Central People's Government of China.75 The Chief
Executive is responsible for appointing principal officials of
66. Id. art. 8. See also id. art. 18. The only law that will not extend past
1997 is British legislation promulgated by the British Parliament. SIHOMBING,
supra note 56, at 185.
67. BASIc LAW, supra note 14, art. 8.
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 18. One example of this veto occurred in August 1995, when a
five year agreement betweenCathay Pacific Airways and Taiwan Airlines Asso-
ciation was declared invalid as contradicting Basic Law. Daniel Kwan, Airlines
Agreement Not Valid, Says China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 28, 1995, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File. China said Cathay was not
authorized to negotiate the agreement. Id.
70. BASIc LAW, supra note 14, arts. 24-42.
71. Id. art. 27.
72. Id. art. 43.
73. The Chief Executive's position is essentially the same as that of the
present Governor of Hong Kong. SIHOMBING, supra note 56, at 183.
74. BASic LAW, supra note 14, art. 45.
75. Id. art. 43.
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Hong Kong SAR,76 implementing the laws of the SAR, 7 7 and
deciding government policies. 78 The Chief Executive also has
the broad power of dissolving the Legislative Council if it re-
fuses to pass a budget or another important bill introduced by
the government. 79 An Executive Council will be available to
aid the Chief Executive in implementing the laws of Hong
Kong SAR.80
2. The Legislative Branch
Basic Law also provides for the continuation of the pres-
ent Legislative Council."1 The Legislative Council enacts,
amends, and appeals laws, approves the budget, and debates
various policy addresses of the Chief Executive.82 The Legis-
lative Council also has the power to impeach the Chief
Executive."3
A bill passed by the legislature goes to the Chief Execu-
tive for approval.8 4 If the Chief Executive does not approve
it, then the bill goes back to the legislature with comments.8 5
If the legislature again passes the bill with the changes, then
the Chief Executive must sign it. 8 6 All bills signed are sub-
ject to review by the Chinese Government. 7
Policy issued by China in July 1995 indicates that China
intends to operate a parallel legislature that will be formed in
late 1996.88 The complexity of having two legislatures oper-
ating at the same time prior to 1997 has been criticized, but
China has implied that the formation of such a legislature,
while problematic, could not be avoided.8 9
76. Id. art. 48.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. art. 50. This drastic move, however, may only be done once during
the Chief Executive's term of office. Id.
80. Id. art. 54.
81. Id. art. 66.
82. Id. art. 73.
83. Id. art. 73(10).
84. Id. arts. 74-75.
85. Id. art. 49.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 17. See discussion infra part 1V.A.1.a.
88. Anson Chan Warns on 1997 Confusion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
20, 1995, at 4, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
89. Id.
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3. The Judicial Branch
Since Hong Kong SAR will continue to operate in a com-
mon law system, it will retain the judiciary as it presently
functions, with district courts, courts of appeal, and a
supreme court. 90 A major role for the courts in the Hong
Kong SAR will be to determine the compatibility of Basic Law
with the laws brought before the courts.9"
Making this compatibility determination requires the
courts to distinguish between adjudication and interpreta-
tion.92 Adjudication is "the legal process of resolving a dis-
pute."93 Interpretation is the "art or process of discovering
and ascertaining the meaning of a statute ... . The power
of final adjudication lies in the judiciary, 5 while the final
right of interpretation rests in China's legislative branch. 6
Basic Law establishes that the power of final adjudica-
tion will be held by a Court of Final Appeal, which will be
established prior to 1997. 97 Its creation will be monitored by
the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group [hereinafter SJLG]. 98
There has been intense conflict regarding formation of the
Court of Final Appeal. 99 This conflict has recently been re-
solved in part.100 The court will begin to operate on July 1,
1997.101 This date has been criticized because it had previ-
ously been agreed that the legislature would be operational
before 1997, so that it could gain experience under British
rule.1 0 2 Three of the four permanent Hong Kong judges sit-
90. BASIC LAW, supra note 14, art. 81.
91. SIHOMBING, supra note 56, at 190.
92. Id.
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (6th ed. 1990).
94. Id. at 817.
95. BASIC LAw, supra note 14, art. 82.
96. Id. art. 158. See also discussion infra part II.D.2.
97. BASIC LAW, supra note 14, art. 82.
98. See supra note 47.
99. A Good Sign for Hong Kong, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 13, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File. Presently, there is some strife
between China and Great Britain regarding formation of the Court of Final
Appeal. See discussion infra part IV.B.1. China has threatened repeatedly to
eliminate this court should Great Britain not follow China's instructions re-
garding its formation. Danny Gittings, Hong Kong: Row Over CFA Judges Ob-
scures Original Intent of Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 2, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File. See also discussion infra part IV.B.1.
100. Gittings, supra note 99.
101. Judging the Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 23, 1995, at 19,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
102. Id.
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ting on the Court of Final Appeal can be of any nationality,
one may be from an outside common law jurisdiction, and the
chief justice must be a Hong Kong Chinese. 1°3
D. Chinese Law
Chinese law is based on a disciplinary system. 104 Dis-
putes are explicated on a case-by-case basis.1"' The process
emphasizes the maintenance of an existing hierarchy, the au-
thority of superior figures, and group cohesion. 10 6 There is a
strong concern for order, so enforcement generally pivots on a
system of duties without rights. 1 0 7
In the past, China has relied primarily on a strong cen-
tralized government, but recently it has become apparent
that such central authority is no longer as powerful as it once
was.10 8 Gradually, local governments have enjoyed more au-
tonomy over their own affairs as China has realized it could
not tightly control all regions.10 9 This decentralization pro-
cess has been enormously successful for China's growth, but
in fact, socialist theory still pervades even these regions. 110
1. Basic Premises of Socialist Law
Socialist law differs from civil and common law systems
because it states an ideology as the framework for perpetuat-
103. Barry Wigham, No Legal Vacuum in Hong Kong, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
1995, at A16.
104. THoMAs B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA 5 (1992).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. This comment will not examine the role human rights plays in the
arena of trade agreements between China and other countries, although sanc-
tions for violations of human rights have been used in the past. To add some
dimension to the discussion, however, it is worth mentioning that "China re-
mains a country in which [a person] has very few rights that can be asserted
against the state and its officials. Civil rights and human rights remain alien
concepts with very little meaning, which the state addresses only under pres-
sure from meddling foreigners." W.F. JENNER, THE TYRANNY OF HISTORY: THE
ROOTS OF CHINA'S CRISIS 147 (1992).
108. Yasheng Huang, Why China Will Not Collapse, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer
1995, at 54.
109. Id.
110. Caspar W. Weinberger, Market-Oriented Socialism Versus the Free
Market, FORBES, Oct. 25, 1993, at 35. Ironically, China's growth is "driven by
nonstate industries, yet state-owned enterprises" still comprise the lion's share
of industrial output. Id. It is these differences that cause concern, since China
does not seem to observe or understand these statistics. Id.
1996]
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ing goals of the society.111 In this framework, the needs of
the individual are subordinated to a singular purpose or
goal.1 12 Thus, socialist economies often create a dual system
of laws: one that applies to domestic businesses, and another
to foreign businesses or joint ventures between domestic and
foreign businessmen.1 1 3 This dual legal system is designed to
preserve the goals of the socialist regime and, at the same
time, foster foreign investment to allow the country to emerge
economically on the world front.1 1 4 This is the struggle that
China is currently engaged in. Its constitution provides that
the individual economy seeks to "complement [the] socialist
economy ... [and] permits [a] private economy to exist" ac-
cording to the limits prescribed by the administrative bodies
of the Chinese Government.
115
2. The Executive Branch
China's administrative system consists of "one-party rule
with centralized decision-making."" 6 Thus, the Communist
Party is China's executive body, and also its central political
body. 117
The State Council is the highest executive body in
China." 8 The Premier of the State Council is the leader of
the State Council."' The State Council functions to direct
and administer almost every aspect of life in China.
120
The State Council issues decisions and orders12 1 and may
adopt administrative regulations, rules, and measures. 22 It
regularly plays an important role in economic reform.' 23 Ad-
111. Anne Carver, Inventing a Legal Tradition, in ADVANCES IN CHINESE IN-
DUSTRIAL STUDIES 31 (Sally Stewart ed., 1995).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 45.
114. Id. at 40. It has been argued that socialism "deprives [China] of the
very knowledge that its [economic advancement] require[s]." Id. at 57.
115. P.R.C. CONST. ch. I, art. 11.
116. Nicholas D. Kristof, China Sees 'Market-Leninism' as Way to Future,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al.
117. Id. at A4.
118. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 85.
119. Id. art. 86. The current Premier is Li Peng. Matt Moffett, China's Com-
munist Party Chief Jiang Bolsters Status as Deng's Heir Apparent, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 2, 1994, at A6.
120. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 89.
121. Id. art. 89(1).
122. Id.
123. Id. art. 89(5).
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ditionally, the State Council conducts foreign affairs and ne-
gotiates foreign treaties and agreements. 124
3. The Legislative Branch
The 1982 Constitution established a five-tier system to
adopt legislation.12 5 These five tiers are the National Peo-
ple's Congress [hereinafter NPCI, the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress (hereinafter SCNPC), the
State Council, local governments, and the Local People's Con-
gresses. 126 Together, the NPC and the SCNPC embody the
legislative power of China. 127
The NPC is the highest lawmaking body, both in theory
and in practice. 128 The NPC possesses the power to amend
the Constitution,1 29 and it can amend and enact all basic
laws. 1 80 Another key function of the NPC is to elect the Pres-
ident of the Supreme People's Court, and the President and
Vice President of China.1 3 1
The SCNPC's chief function is to interpret the Constitu-
tion and supervise its enforcement, 13 2 except for those laws
which are exclusively within the power of the NPC. 33 The
Constitution specifically grants the SCNPC power to decide
on international treaties and "important [international]
agreements."3 4 Further, the SCNPC is the supervisory body
124. Id. art. 89(9).
125. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 57, 85, 95.
126. Id. Local governments will not be discussed here, as they deal primar-
ily with administration regulation and are not relevant to the discussion at
hand. JENNER, supra note 107, at 86. They play an important role in the legal
system, since most laws are so broadly drafted that they offer little explanation
regarding implementation. Id.
Local People's Congresses have the power to adopt local legislation. P.R.C.
CONST. ch. III, art. 99. These local laws apply only to the geographic area in
which they sit. JENNER, supra note 107, at 87. Local People's Congresses may
only adopt laws where the Central Government has not yet done so, and the
laws cannot conflict with any law promulgated by the Central Government. Id.
127. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 58.
128. ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 79 (1992).
129. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 62(1).
130. Id. art. 62(3).
131. Id. art. 62(4). In addition, the NPC holds the power to recall the Presi-
dent and the President of the Supreme Court. Id. art. 63.
132. Id. art. 67(1).
133. Id. art. 67(2).
134. Id. art. 67(14).
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governing the State Council and the Supreme People's
Court.13 5
4. The Judicial Branch
There are four levels of organization in China's judicial
branch:136 the Supreme People's Court,1 3 7 the High People's
Court, 138 the Intermediate People's Courts,139 and the Basic
Level People's Courts. 140 All courts hold general jurisdiction,
but most have divisions within them.141 All four courts are
organized in the same way. They each have a President, a
Vice President, a Chief Judge, Associate Chief Judges, and
Adjudicators. 142 Judges are appointed by members of the
NPC who hold equivalent positions,' 43 and they serve limited
terms. 144
There are many problems with China's court system.
First, there is a problem regarding judicial competence. 145
Modern legal training was virtually nonexistent until after
the beginning of the new economic system.146 From approxi-
mately the mid-1950's to the late 1970's, no legal training
whatsoever took place. 147  Consequently, many currently
serving judges do not possess any formal legal training on
which to base their decisions.
148
Another problem is that there is no formal precedential
value to judicial decisions, primarily because decisions are
unpublished.149 The result is a less formal system. 150 In
135. Id. art. 67(6).
136. CHEN, supra note 128, at 107.
137. Id. at 108.
138. Id. at 107. These consist of approximately 31 autonomous regions and
provinces. Id.
139. Id. There are approximately 376 intermediate courts. Id.
140. Id. There are approximately 3000 basic level courts. Id.
141. Id. at 108. These divisions are criminal, civil, economic, and adminis-
trative. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 109. As an example, the President would be considered approxi-
mately the same level as a member of the NPC, and the Vice President would be
approximately the same level as a member of the SCNPC.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 110.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 109. As of 1991, approximately 40-50% of judges lacked any kind
of legal training. Id. Indeed, many judges are ex-army, or former public or
security officials. Id.
149. Id. at 114.
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China, a judge actually plays a more important role than a
judge operating under a common law system of adjudication,
because he is asked to serve as a trier of fact as well as law. 15
1
Moreover, corruption continues to be a significant prob-
lem.152 Corruption can present serious problems in countries
where politics heavily influence legislative and judicial deci-
sions. 153 Problems with corruption may cause problems with
judicial independence.
Enforcement of decisions is another difficulty.' Be-
cause there is no precedential value to the courts' decisions,
the courts lack importance as an institution. This view of the
judicial system has the effect of reducing the creation of en-
forcement mechanisms which are clearly the cornerstone of a
just judicial system.155 Lastly, problems of interpretation in-
fest the judicial system, because the power of final interpreta-
tion lies in the legislature, not the judiciary.15
E. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
1. What is GATT?
The General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs157 was
formed by twenty-three countries in 1947.158 The original
underlying principles of GATT consisted of destroying trade
barriers, establishing a trade regime, and developing an in-
stitution that could expedite these principles and ideals.'5 9
Key GATT policies involve open markets and nondiscrimina-
tion between GATT members.
16 0
150. Id. at 112.
151. Id.
152. S.Y. Yue & C.K. Lau, Challenge for Professions, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 5, 1994, at 15, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
153. Id. Corruption appears to be worsening, and reports assert that "a few
years ago the problem was petty bribery of a few dollars; now [it numbers in
the] millions or billions." Kristof, supra note 116, at A5.
154. JENNER, supra note 107, at 146. Enforcement is not a problem in the
criminal courts, and these judgments are enforced absolutely. Id. at 146-47.
155. Id.
156. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 67(6).
157. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
158. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MACY 50 (1990).
159. PAuL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusmEssS AND ECONOMICS
58 (1993).
160. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(hereinafter GATT 1994], pmbl.
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Over the years, the original GATT terms have been re-
peatedly negotiated and subjected to numerous multilateral
trade negotiations. 161 The evolution of GATT has created a
number of other provisions which were necessary to function
in an increasingly global economic trade system.1 62
One of GATT's key provisions, which has undergone a
number of changes since 1947, is its dispute resolution sys-
tem.163 A primary problem with GATT is that its dispute set-
tlement system contains no legal power and no real enforce-
ment mechanism.16 4 Also, current enforcement mechanisms,
in particular trade sanctions, are in fact somewhat inconsis-
tent with GATT principles of free trade. 65
The United States Congress recently ratified GATT 1994,
which will replace the previous GATT negotiation.' 66 GATT
1994 creates the WTO, which will resolve world trade dis-
putes. 67 The WTO creates a permanent seven-member
panel to adjudicate disputes.' 68 From these seven members,
three will be chosen to adjudicate an individual dispute. 169 If
a challenge succeeds, then the panel will attempt to reach a
solution to which both countries must adhere. 70 Since ulti-
mately each party must agree to this decision, disputing par-
ties are, in effect, "judges of their own cause.
161. STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 159, at 59.
162. Id. at 58.
163. Id. at 59.
164. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN & MEINHARD HILF, THE NEW GATT ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 346 (1991).
165. Id. at 557. This fact is particularly true with respect to anti-dumping
provisions which allow countervailing duties to be imposed upon noncomplying
countries that refuse to adhere to rulings of the GATT dispute resolution panel.
GATT 1994, supra note 160, art. VI. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Sept. 26, 1984 [hereinafter GATT 1984], art. VI.
166. Stewart M. Powell, Senate Unites to Pass GATT, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 2,
1994, at Al. As of August 31, 1994, Hong Kong was one of 118 countries that
had signed GATT 1994. Report on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1127 (1994). However, China is not a member. See discussion in-
fra part II.E.3.
167. Harvey Berkman, As GATT Gains, Will States Wane?, NAT'L L. J., Nov.
14, 1994, at 20.
168. Id.
169. GATT 1994, supra note 160, annex 2, art. 3.
170. Id.
171. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE 393 (1995).
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Member countries must accept the findings of the
panel.1 72 This obligation is grounded in the idea that mem-
ber nations will treat GATT authority as bearing the same
strength as their own domestic law adjudication. 73 If mem-
ber nations do not treat GATT authority as having the same
strength, this would effectively weaken the position of GATT
and signal a "legal failure."' 74
If a solution cannot be reached, or a situation rectified,
the offended country may retaliate with tariff or trade barri-
ers, without fear of backlash. 75 Generally, commentators
view GATT 1994 and the birth of the WTO in the following
manner:
GATT [was] no more than a contract. It [was] not an in-
ternational [organization] and lack[ed] a solid legal foun-
dation. The [new GATT] agreement will bring about a
most important change. It will create a multilateral
World Trade Organization with the same status as, for ex-
ample, the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund. 176
The WTO was designed to "[provide] security and pre-
dictability to the multilateral trading system."' 77 GATT 1994
specifies that the WTO "shall provide the common institu-
tional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters related to the agreements and associ-
ated legal instruments .... The agreements and associated
legal instruments . . . [bind] all Members."' 78  Again, the
strength of this assertion bears directly upon member na-
tions' acceptance of WTO as a binding legal instrument. 79
172. HuDEC, supra note 158, at 364.
173. After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, Daily Report for
Executives, Jan. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Curnws File.
174. Id.
175. GATT 1994, supra note 160, annex 2, art. 3. Such retaliation has gener-
ally had little effect in actually ending trade disputes, and is almost inconse-
quential when levied by smaller countries on larger, more powerful economies.
TREBILCOCK & HowsE, supra note 171, at 396.
176. China in GATT Could Put US [sic] in a Fix, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
177. Agreement Embodying the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1266 [hereinafter WTO Charter], art. II.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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2. Hong Kong's Membership
Hong Kong has been a member of GATT since 1986.180
The Joint Declaration provides for Hong Kong's continued
separate membership."8 ' Basic Law also specifically provides
for Hong Kong's separate membership in GATT.18 2 GATT it-
self also provides for membership of certain territories which
have full autonomy in conducting commercial relations, such
as Hong Kong. 183
3. China's Application for Membership
a. History
China is currently not a member of GATT.18 1 It was a
founding member of GATT in 1947.185 However, in 1949, it
withdrew from the organization following the assumption of
Communist leadership."8 6 In 1986, it became clear to China
that it needed GATT,18 7 so it subsequently filed an official
membership application' 88 and began to make significant
strides in implementing various economic programs designed
to assist its re-entry.18
9
The United States chairs China's admission commit-
tee. 190 The primary concern with China's membership is its
trade law and policies.' 91 The United States is concerned
about China's commitment to a free market. 92
The United States views GATT membership as having
certain benefits and responsibilities, and China has problems
180. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 139.
181. Joint Declaration, supra note 4, art. VI.
182. BASIC LAW, supra note 14, art. 116.
183. GATT 1984, supra note 165, art. XXVI, § 5(c).
184. GATT 1994, supra note 160, pmbl.
185. GATT 1947, supra note 157, art. XXVI.
186. Trade Officials Doubt China Will Be in GATT Before '95, Japan Eco-
nomic Newswire, May 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
187. Chinese Vice Premier Prods U.S. on China's Accession to GATT, Daily
Report for Executives, Nov. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library,
Curnws File.
188. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 139.
189. Former United States Trade Representative Ambassador Clayton Yeut-
ter, Address at the American Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong (Feb. 5, 1988).
190. Trade Officials Doubt China Will Be in GATT Before '95, supra note
186.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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realizing that it has not yet met the minimum standards. 193
This delay has no immediate impact on the United States'
trade with China, however, because China was granted con-
ditional renewal of its Most Favored Nation1 9 4 status for the
current year,195 and has also recently been granted observer
status. 196
b. Why China's Application Has Not Been
Accepted by GATT
Four main issues must be resolved before China's appli-
cation can be accepted: transparency of trade laws, separate
domestic and foreign trade laws, convertibility of China's cur-
rency, and protection of intellectual property rights.197
(1) The Transparency Requirement
One of the main problems with China's application is its
lack of a consistent, written set of laws.' 98 The necessity of
this is based on the premise that a successful market "must
be controlled through known and impersonal rules that can
be enforced."' 99 Without set rules, foreign businesses and in-
dividual investors will not have the confidence to invest,
short- or long-term, in China.2 ° °
Article 10 of GATT 1984 requires that a country's trade
rules be published.20 ' In 1994, China published its trade law
193. Victor Ego Ducrot, China: World's Third Largest Economy Excluded
from GATT, Inter-Press Service, May 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, Allasi File.
194. Most Favored Nation [hereinafter MFN] status allows China to trade
with the United States based on the nondiscrimination principle of GATT
although China is not a member of GATT. STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 159, at
668. This principle states that the United States will engage in trade policies
whereby it treats China no worse than any other country. Id.
195. Time to Take a New Path, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 28, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
196. Dede Nickerson, Officials Warn on Fast Entry to WTO, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, July 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
197. China to Shun World Unless U.S. Backs Down, China Gives Ultimatum
on GATT, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Schina File.
198. Carver, supra note 111, at 11.
199. JENNER, supra note 107, at 148.
200. Id. at 148-49.
201. GATT 1984, supra note 165, art. X. GATT/WTO does not seek to make
world trade fair. Rather, it seeks to establish rules by which all member na-
tions can participate in free trade. STEPHEN ET AL., supra note 159, at 672.
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in order to meet the transparency requirement. °2 At the
present time, China's securities, banking, company, and labor
laws are awaiting approval. 20  Notwithstanding these ef-
forts, the transparency requirement has not been fulfilled be-
cause, like much of China's other recently published legisla-
tion, it is very ambiguous. In fact, numerous legal scholars
have asserted that although trade laws continue to be pub-
lished, the ambiguity of such laws creates a legal ground that
is "more rather than less opaque."20 4
For instance, the general commercial code is less specific
than most industrialized nations are used to, and willing to,
deal with.20 5 In fact, until the 1980's there was no written
commercial code at all.20 6 In the scurry to attract investors
into China, c~eg w~rd hastily writton.2 07 Ambiguous laws,
coupled with an extreme shortage of lawyers20° and a stub-
born adherence to party policy, 20 9 have created an uncertain
ground upon which to build trade and investment agree-
ments for American businesses.210 The existing codes are
mainly administrative, and they rely heavily on mediation.211
Furthermore, they require constant reinterpretation, since
the judiciary's decisions lack precedential value.212 Not only
is it necessary for China to publish its commercial and prop-
erty law, but China must create it. 2 1 3
One necessary related aspect of the difficulty of attaining
total transparency is the existence of an internal "neibu"
statement.21 4 Neibu statements are internal statements that
seek to advance the political goals of China's socialist soci-
ety. 15 In effect, these statements have greater strength
202. STEPHEN ET AL., supra note 159, at 672.
203. Carver, supra note 111, at 22.
204. Id. at 28.
205. JENNER, supra note 107, at 150.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 142.
209. Id. at 150.
210. Id. at 151.
211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying note 146.
213. JENNER, supra note 107, at 151.
214. Anne Carver, Priests and Worshippers: International Business in
China, in CHINESE MANAGEMENT ISSUES FOR THE 1990's (John Child ed., forth-
coming 1996).
215. Id.
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within the political and legal structure of China than any
promulgated law.216
(2) Domestic and Foreign Investment Laws
One key problem that precludes China's entrance into
GATT is that its dual legal system creates problems for for-
eign investors.217 This dual system exists because the Chi-
nese Constitution mandates the implementation of foreign in-
vestment as part of its planned socialist economy.218 In
essence, China has created a system whereby domestic and
foreign economic policy are run under a socialist theory, even
though the only foreign economic policy that can allow China
to grow must exist under a capitalist scheme. The dual sys-
tem interferes with such growth, and yet China continues to
be extremely stubborn about preserving the socialist system
in the face of market expansion.21 9
The dual legal system reflects China's desire to continue
to tightly control its market and those who deal within that
market, a goal that directly interferes with GATT's central
purpose of liberalizing the market.22 ° China views foreign in-
vestment as essential, but under the guise of national sover-
eignty, it still maintains its right to control capital move-
ment, property rights, and "conditions under which national
or legal persons can exercise economic activity."221 Such laws
make it more difficult for foreigners to invest in China be-
cause presently the dual system creates an atmosphere in
which China "[seeks] to build up domestic industries ... at
the expense of international competition."222 This directly
contradicts GATT principles.
Another issue related to this system involves the prob-
lem of land ownership. In China, foreigners cannot own
land.223 Instead, they can only lease it. 224 This problem is
particularly acute with respect to property rights, since prop-
216. Id.
217. MICHAEL J. MOSER, FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 90 (1987).
218. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, arts. 15, 89.
219. MOSER, supra note 217, at 92.
220. STEPHEN ET AL., supra note 159, at 672.
221. Carver, supra note 111, at 35.
222. After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, supra note 173,
at 48.
223. P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 10.
224. Id.
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erty in China is still owned by the state.225 Overseas inves-
tors are similarly precluded from owning property.226 In or-
der to invest in property or use land for the purpose of
promoting foreign business, the foreign investor must form a
joint venture with a Chinese entity.227 Uneven treatment of
the foreign investor makes investment a precarious
venture.228
(3) Inconvertible Currency
China's currency, the renminbi, is inconvertible cur-
22rency. 29 In other words, any renminbi earned on domestic
sales is not readily convertible into foreign exchange. 23 0 The
original principle behind Chinese foreign currency limita-
tions is that the government "views foreign currency owned
by trading companies and enterprises as ultimately belong-
ing to the State."23 1 Therefore, China does not want currency
taken out of the country, and it must be exchanged in
China.23 2 The only way to exchange foreign currency is
through mainland swap centers.23 3
China's investment regulations require that there be a
foreign exchange balance, which means that revenues must
cover expenditures before money can be exchanged for for-
234eign currency. In addition, market forces usually make it
difficult to swap all money directly earned on domestic sales,
resulting in slow extraction of profits from China for foreign
investors.235
225. LAND ADMINISTRATION LAW OF THE PRC, art. 6 (on file with author).
226. PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES GOVERNING COMMERCIAL LAND
DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT BY FOREIGN INVESTORS, art. 2 (P.R.C.) (on file
with author).
227. Id. art. 4.
228. Id.
229. John Frisbie & Richard Brecher, A Tough Balancing Act, CHINA Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 9.
230. Id.
231. Virginia Davis & Carlos Yi, Balancing Foreign Exchange, CHINA Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 15.
232. Id.
233. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 229, at 9. China eliminated swap centers
as the sole exchange centers in 1994, but the problem of foreign exchange still
exists because it is still extremely difficult to exchange money in the short run.
Lucille A. Barale & Thomas E. Jones, Getting Strict with Foreign Exchange,
CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 52.
234. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 229, at 9. This balance requirement ef-
fectively prevents the convertibility of renminbi into other foreign currency. Id.
235. Id.
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China's inconvertible currency problem makes foreign in-
vestors nervous about investing in Hong Kong.23 6 Therefore,
in June 1991, the SJLG reached an "investment protection
agreement," which sought to make foreign investors feel se-
cure about their investments in Hong Kong.23 7 One provision
allowed Hong Kong investors to remove their investments
without restrictions on conversion into foreign currency.2 8
(4) Inadequate Intellectual Property Protection
Intellectual property continues to be a source of great
tension with respect to China's membership application,
since in the past China has failed to provide adequate protec-
tion for copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets.239
In addition to GATT requirements regarding intellectual
property, China is also being pressured by the World Intellec-
tual Property Association to conform to world standards of
protection.24 ° China has made a strong effort in this area by
issuing updated regulations nearly every year in order to
meet the standards imposed, but still has been unable to
meet the expectations of the GATT admissions committee.241
One primary difficulty has been China's failure to enforce
the laws it writes, as exemplified by continuing United
States-China trade problems.242 China's struggle with nego-
tiations over protection of intellectual property rights pre-
cludes it from joining GATT, because it is "openly breaking"
the rules of GATT 1994.243 For instance, the United States
has insisted that China close twenty-nine factories in South-
236. Kent Chen, Protection for Overseas Investors, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Joseph T. Simone, Jr., Improving Protection of Intellectual Property,
CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 9.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 11.
242. Allison Smith, China Piracy Hits U.S. Firms Hard, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb.
13, 1995, at D1. Current figures estimate that the United States loses close to
$900 million due to piracy of movies, music, computers, and books because of
China's inadequate enforcement of intellectual property protection legislation.
Id. Complaints filed with the International Intellectual Property Association
place the total loss for 42 complaining companies at approximately $8.6 billion
per year. China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted for Inaction of Intellectual Prop-
erty, Daily Report for Executives, Feb. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legnew
Library, Curnws File.
243. China Piracy Hits U.S. Firms Hard, supra note 242, at D4.
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ern China that churn out pirated goods. 244 The United States
and other countries concerned with China's inability to ad-
dress such a request view the problem as directly connected
to the fact that "reported involvement of the army and some
government officials in pirating operations has also stymied
crackdown efforts."245
Despite the fact that in February, 1995, China and the
United States signed a new intellectual property rights
agreement aimed at ending the trade war, much concern still
exists regarding China's intent to enforce the provisions
under the agreement.246 All of these difficulties invariably
contribute to the United States' concern about Hong Kong's
transition in 1997.
(5) Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Lastly, China does not want to subject its disputes to the
settlement mechanisms that bind current WTO members.24 7
F. Current United States Policy Toward Hong Kong in
Preparation for 1997
On October 5, 1992, President George Bush signed the
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act into law.248 The Act
gives the United States the authority to treat Hong Kong as a
nonsovereign entity distinct from China.249 The Act identi-
fies the United States' stance on negotiation and enforcement
of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements involving the
United States and Hong Kong.250 The United States will con-
tinue to trade and negotiate agreements post-1997 in the
same manner that it did prior to that date.25' Economic
agreements will continue to be negotiated directly with Hong
Kong.252 Addressing China's sovereign power over Hong
Kong post-1997, the United States stated its intention to deal
244. Jim Abrahms, U.S., China Leave Room to Resolve Trade War, S.F. Ex-
AMINER, Feb. 6, 1995, at B2.
245. Id.
246. Nickerson, supra note 196, at 1.
247. Gerald Segal, We Can Shape China as a Congenial Superpower, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995.
248. Hong Kong-United States Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, 106
Stat. 1448 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (1992)).
249. 22 U.S.C. § 5711 (Supp. IV 1992).
250. Id. § 5712.
251. Id. § 5713(10).
252. Id. § 5713(2).
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with Hong Kong as a "fully autonomous" region from China
"with respect to economic and trade matters."25
The United States also acknowledges China's part in eco-
nomic agreements with respect to bilateral investment trea-
ties,254 stating that these agreements will be made "in consul-
tation with the People's Republic of China."255
The Act preserves the rights and obligations of the
United States regarding international contracts and agree-
ments the United States and Hong Kong have entered prior
to 1997.256 In addition, the Act mandates the application of
United States law for adjudication of disputes in the same
manner as currently exists.257 The United States acknowl-
edges its strong interest in the "continued vitality, prosperity,
and stability of Hong Kong."25 8
Indeed, Hong Kong is the thirteenth largest market for
American exports. 2 9 The United States currently has ap-
proximately $6 billion invested in Hong Kong.26 ° Hong
Kong's location plays an integral role in American trade with
China and Southeast Asia, both burgeoning world mar-
kets.2 6' It has been argued that Hong Kong needs the United
States in order to ensure the continuation of its capitalist free
market.2 62
The United States has also issued a number of United
States-Hong Kong Policy Reports. The most recent report, is-
sued April 1, 1995, stated that the United State has become
"increasingly concerned by China's slowness to reach impor-
tant agreements regarding Hong Kong's transition through
1997 - particularly those which affect U.S. interests."26 3 In
253. Id. § 5713(3).
254. Id. § 5713(10).
255. Id.
256. Id. § 5721(b).
257. Id. § 5721(a).
258. Id. § 5701(4).
259. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 173.
260. American Consulate General, Remarks on U.S. Direct Investment in
Hong Kong Global and Regional Context, Hong Kong (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with
author).
261. See William McGurn, Hong Kong Needs U.S. Voice, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
June 21, 1990, at 34.
262. Id. The United States is also valuable to Hong Kong. Approximately
40% of all Hong Kong's exports go to the United States. Id.
263. Simon Beck, USA: China 'Slow to Act' on Transition, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, Apr. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File.
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this report, the United States urged the SJLG to reach an
agreement on several key issues which China refuses at pres-
ent to discuss.264 One of those issues is the continuance of
the Legislative Council as it currently operates and the estab-
lishment of the Court of Final Appeal, both provided for in
the Joint Declaration and Basic Law.265 The United States
asserted in this report that it would view China's resolution
of these issues as a strong indication that China wishes to
comply with the provisions of the Joint Declaration.2 66
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Having created a framework within which to discuss the
problems of post-1997 trade negotiations with China and
Hong Kong, this comment presents an analysis of what could
happen post-1997, and the impact all of these changes can
have on American businesses investing in Hong Kong
SAR.267 Sorting out the potential for difficulties here is
multifaceted.
Domestic governments play an important role in interna-
tional trade and investment, because adherence is only as
good as the laws which govern it. Therefore, identifying po-
tential problems in China and Hong Kong's future becomes
imperative to determining what the United States can do to
protect its own interests.268 Examining the likelihood of
China's adherence to the Joint Declaration and Basic Law,
observing China's own interest in maintaining its economic
well-being,269 the impact of China's current political cli-
mate27 0 and GATT membership 27 1 will complete the picture
of this complex interaction.
Finally, proposals as to how the United States can best
mitigate such an uncertain trading future will offer a per-
spective on the dynamics of trade and investment between
264. Id.
265. Hong Kong: Law - US Fears over Future of Hong Kong Legal System,
Lloyd's List, Apr. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
266. Id.
267. Of course, this argument focuses on a somewhat longer period of time
than immediately after 1997.
268. See discussion infra part IV.
269. See discussion infra part V.B.2.
270. See discussion infra part 1V.E.1.
271. See discussion infra part V.D.
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Hong Kong and the United States. 2 Again, this comment
asks the question: what will happen in 1997?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Resolving Inconsistencies Between Basic Law and the
Chinese Constitution
1. Separation of Powers
One main problem with the interaction between the
Hong Kong SAR and China concerns the apparent lack of
separation of powers. Arguably, the Constitution of China
and Basic Law each set out government structure denoting
the executive, judiciary, and legislature as separate branches
of government.2 73 However, in examining the articles as they
interact, it becomes apparent that, at present, there can be no
separation in practice.
a. Conflicts Between the Legislature and the
Executive
While the Legislative Council is responsible for enacting
laws,274 all laws passed by the Legislature must ultimately
be approved by the Chief Executive.2 75 If the Chief Executive
must answer to the Central People's Government, there is ef-
fectively no distinction between the Executive and the Legis-
lature. This assertion is particularly true here, because the
Chief Executive can dissolve the Legislature once per term
for a number of wide-ranging reasons. 6 Alternatively, the
Legislature only has the power to impeach, not remove, the
Chief Executive, and cannot prevent its own dissolution.277
This structure creates an awkward inequity because the ex-
ecutive branch has power over the legislative branch. This
lack of separation does not comport with Hong Kong's present
civil system, which Basic Law purports to preserve.278
Even if the Chief Executive fails to function within his
obligation to the Central People's Government, or is forced to
approve a bill the legislature passes the second time, each
272. See discussion infra part V.
273. See supra parts II.C, II.D.
274. See supra text accompanying note 82.
275. See supra text accompanying note 84.
276. See supra text accompanying note 79.
277. See supra text accompanying note 83.
278. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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new law, once enacted, must be sent to Beijing for review by
the SCNPC. 279 Then, only if the subject matter falls solely
under the jurisdiction of Hong Kong, will the law remain a
law.28 ° China may arbitrarily decide that a new law contra-
venes Basic Law and simply repeal it. 281 Giving China this
ultimate veto power effectively renders Hong Kong SAR's leg-
islature powerless. This situation hardly gives Hong Kong
SAR an autonomous existence.
China specifically reserves this scrutiny with respect to
foreign affairs, which can invariably cause problems for for-
eign investment and trade laws promulgated by the Legisla-
ture.28 2 Again, the line between the Executive and the Legis-
lature becomes more and more blurred. Either way, China's
executive body, the SCNPC, or Hong Kong's executive body,
the Chief Executive, has final say over the acts of the
Legislature.
b. Conflicts Between the Judiciary and the
Executive
A separation of powers problem also exists between the
judicial and executive branches. Two limitations on judicial
power exist. First, the final power of interpretation lies in the
SCNPC, which is an executive body.28 3 Thus, regardless of
what the judiciary rules, the SCNPC can potentially enter
and interpret the law as it pleases. Hong Kong SAR will have
no choice but to accept whatever the interpretation is.
Second, article 18 limits the power of Hong Kong SAR's
legislature to adjudicate foreign affairs issues.28 4 Not only
does the SCNPC have the sole power to bring any kind of for-
eign adjudication within its jurisdiction, it also has the sole
power to determine what the term "foreign affairs"
encompasses.28 5
Article 158 authorizes Hong Kong to refer to SCNPC for
assistance in interpretation.28 6 Although Hong Kong SAR
can ask for assistance, the SCNPC has the power to unilater-
279. See supra text accompanying note 87.
280. See supra text accompanying note 86.
281. BAsic LAW, supra note 14, art. 17.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See supra text accompanying note 53.
285. BASIc LAW, supra note 14, art. 13.
286. Id. art. 158.
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ally decide what is within its scope.28 7 If the subject matter
concerns affairs of the Central Government or the relation-
ship between Hong Kong and China, Hong Kong must refer
to the SCNPC for guidance. This provision is so broad that it
can potentially encompass any matter.
Thus, although supposedly operating autonomously,
when Hong Kong has problems interpreting conflicts and cer-
tain portions of Basic Law, these difficulties will force the
SCNPC to take a more active role in Hong Kong's govern-
ment. The SCNPC will therefore become more important in
the relationship between Hong Kong and China, again dimin-
ishing Hong Kong SAR's independence.
Another difficulty is the uncertainty of whether, and
when, the SCNPC will choose to challenge a law. This pros-
pect could cause Hong Kong SAR laws to lose their determi-
native nature, resulting in confusion in Hong Kong SAR.
This also creates a situation where a citizen could potentially
challenge a law by bringing it before the SCNPC, delaying its
enactment while the SCNPC makes its determination. This
would hamper the effectiveness of the Legislature.
Even more difficulties arise given the lack of precedential
value of judicial decisions. 2 8 A system is therefore created
whereby the interpretation of written laws can change with
the will and visions of party leaders based on what they be-
lieve to be the present party policy. This problem seriously
hampers China's ability to build a strong framework within
which United States businesses can operate. Indeed, a mar-
ket system can only exist "within a [framework] of laws relat-
ing to property, contract and tort, and in an environment of
the rule of law."289
If these conflicts between the Basic Law and the Chinese
Constitution cannot be resolved before 1997, it will be unclear
what the law of Hong Kong actually is. The power of the
SCNPC may actually create consistency between Basic Law
and the Constitution, but this consistency will be at the will
of the Chinese Government.
287. Id. art. 13.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
289. Carver, supra note 111, at 27.
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2. The Influence of Politics on China's Governmental
Structure
It is possible that the idea of a checks and balances sys-
tem between the executive and judiciary, or between the ex-
ecutive and the legislature, could work, as it does in many
countries. However, China's executive branch is not just an-
other branch of government. Although the current Chinese
Constitution contains no specific references to how the Com-
munist Party should function in each branch of govern-
ment,290 the Preamble mandates that the Communist Party
will guide China's leadership.291 Thus, the world must rely
on the expectation that Communist Party policies essentially
run the Chinese Government.
If this is true, then the SCNPC and NPC are instruments
of the Party, making the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, who
is responsible to those bodies, responsible to the ideologies of
the Communist Party as well. In effect, Hong Kong cannot
ever achieve or maintain any real independence in its govern-
ment. Possibly, China's desire to retain control may become
more important than maintaining economic stability in Hong
Kong SAR.
Indeed, there seems to be evidence in Basic Law of
China's desire to maintain the strength of the Communist
Party. First, if China were as democratic as its Constitution
purports it to be, Basic Law would not be so concerned with
curbing Hong Kong SAR's powers, when Hong Kong's success
is based on laissez faire economic policies.292 Any limitations
China places on Hong Kong SAR's independence are ironic,
considering that China's chief reasons for resuming sovereign
power over Hong Kong are Hong Kong's economic power and
potential for further growth. Through Hong Kong, China
wishes to extend such growth to itself. Hong Kong's success
in world trade and investment are due to the principles upon
which its government is based.
290. Id.
291. P.R.C. CONST. pmbl. Deng Xiaopeng reaffirmed this commitment at the
Eighth National People's Congress, on March 15, 1993, by stating that "[t~he
core task of economic construction [of] Communist Party Leadership (is to] pre-
serve unity and stability. Over the next five years we have to make a great step
forward towards the establishment of a socialist market economy system."
Carver, supra note 111, at 4.
292. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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Second, a stipulation in the Joint Declaration and in Ba-
sic Law provides for only a fifty year guarantee of auton-
omy. 293 If China really intended Hong Kong SAR to continue
functioning as a capitalist economy, it would not impose any
time limitation within which the Joint Declaration and Basic
Law would remain valid. These facts point toward the possi-
bility that China does not intend to dispose of its socialist
policies.
Finally, the Joint Declaration provides for a "high degree
of autonomy" rather than "autonomy."294 While it is expected
that China would not want to give up complete control, this
phrasing leaves open the possibility that China can measure
autonomy in any manner it wishes. Thus, true independence
is not an option for Hong Kong unless the Communist Party
releases its hold on governmental bodies.295
Even China acknowledges the conflict between Party pol-
icy and Hong Kong's free market economy.296 Officials admit-
ted that the transition is "fraught with uncertainty," and that
it is "inevitable that [China will] fail to manage some things
appropriately and well."297 In a statement before the Party
Committee Meeting in Beijing on March 13, Party Officials
stated that they would "govern Hong Kong in the same man-
ner."298 This language strengthens the argument that Party
policy cannot be completely uninfluential in the governing of
Hong Kong. If it were truly likely that Party policy would not
293. Joint Declaration, supra note 4, pmbl.
294. BAsic LAW, supra note 14, art. II.
295. See discussion infra part V. This situation can be likened to the current
situation with established Special Economic Zones [hereinafter SEZs] in China.
China has given the SEZs special provincial power within which to promulgate
and interpret laws which further their economic growth. P.R.C. CONST. arts.
116-118. However, it continues to reserve for the Central Government the
power to determine whether a contradiction occurs between that SEZs' law and
the P.R.C. Constitution. Id. Where it is determined that conflicts occur, the
SCNPC determines the legitimacy and interpretation of that law. Id. Such a
reservation of power gives the SEZs "no authority to enact laws necessary for
economic reforms." Carver, supra note 111, at 30. This situation is similar to
Hong Kong's, and thus a similar outcome could occur.
296. China: Li Ruihuam Admits "Many Issues and Many Difficulties" on
Hong Kong Issue, BBC Monitoring Service: Far East, Mar. 16, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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interfere, then Party officials would discuss the governing of
Hong Kong as within their realm of power.299
3. International Rights and Obligations
Another area of concern is what will happen to bilateral
and multilateral treaties that the British entered into prior to
1997. Either these treaties must be renegotiated with Hong
Kong under the Basic Law, or they must be honored as they
stand. The United States has opted to treat these obligations
as containing the same rights and obligations as when the
agreements were originally negotiated and signed. 30 0 It is
unclear whether China will allow these rights and obligations
to stand if they feel the provisions contravene Basic Law or
fall under the foreign affairs limitation on Hong Kong SAR's
autonomy.30 1
B. The Likelihood of China's Adherence3 0 2 to Joint
Declaration and Basic Law Provisions
Projections of China's likely adherence to the Joint Dec-
laration and Basic Law range from the optimistic to the pes-
simistic. While China does hold a huge stake in adhering to
the provisions of the Joint Declaration, because of its desire
299. Indeed, the continuing emphasis of the Party's role pervades even the
most economically growing states in China. Shanghai aims to become the "in-
ternational and financial business center of the western Pacific," and it is cur-
rently China's manufacturing center, with billions of dollars in foreign invest-
ment continuing to flow into it. Joyce Barnathan, Asia's Supercities, Bus. WK.,
May 1, 1995, at 151. Shanghai is also home to China's largest stock market.
Id. Yet despite this growth, "Shanghai remains a tightly controlled, Commu-
nist-run city where free-market forces remain shackled by the state and where
the party bureaucrats in Beijing ultimately pull the strings." Keith B.
Richburg, Shanghai or Hong Kong: Which Will Be China's Financial King,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws
File. The Party's stronghold on Shanghai is yet another indication that despite
certain regions' success, China has difficulty realizing that Party policy can
stagnate continued growth of the country.
300. See discussion supra part II.F.
301. See supra part IV.A.1.
302. Adherence is a wholly subjective term in this situation. As discussed
below in part IV.C, China's view of adherence to the principles of Basic Law
may be seen as interference by Hong Kong SAR and the rest of the world. For
example, if China asserts its power to resolve a trade negotiation, it may
characterize it as foreign affairs, which would make it appropriately within its
power under article 13. BAsic LAw, supra note 14, art. 13. However, Hong
Kong SAR may take the view that trade negotiations are purely within its own
power under article 151. Id. art. 151.
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to capitalize on Hong Kong's economic prowess, 303 there are
many factors to take into account in making such a
projection.
1. Legally Binding Nature of the Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration is a serious political compromise
for China, since China has always felt that Hong Kong be-
longed to it anyway. China is probably aware, however, that
the way it handles Hong Kong during the transition will be
watched by the whole world. Although there are no clear
means of enforcement, China does not enter into treaties
lightly. Nevertheless, China has a spotty record of enforcing
treaties into which it does enter.3 0 4 There is already practical
evidence of China's unwillingness to allow Hong Kong SAR
the autonomy expressed under Basic Law. 05
On the other hand, it also seems clear that the Joint Dec-
laration contains no provision for consequences of breaching
the agreement. The Joint Declaration is a bilateral treaty be-
tween Great Britain and China, but in effect Britain has no
further stake in Hong Kong's sovereignty. If no consequences
exist, there is a disincentive for China to follow the Joint
Declaration.
Already, China is balking at reaching agreements on
many key issues related to the transition.0 6 One example of
this was China's threat to abolish the Court of Final Appeal,
based on British and American pressure to establish it.
30 7
Great Britain wanted to establish the court before 1997 in
order to alleviate investors' fears that their concerns will not
be adjudicated by Hong Kong law. 08 Because China consist-
ently insists on doing things at its own pace, progress has
303. Hong Kong's Gross National Product was 20 times more than China's,
although China's population is 180 times greater than Hong Kong's. HONG
KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44, at 96. The eco-
nomic benefits for adherence are clearly significant.
304. Contra MIRON MUSHKAT, THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF HONG KONG 75
(1990); MOSER, supra note 217, at 509.
305. In 1991, China tried to block the construction of a new airport on
Lantau Island. Weighing Hong Kong's Future, supra note 16, at 31. Then, it
sharply criticized the construction of a bridge to the airport, because the con-
tractor was British. Id. China said it would have chosen the South Korean
company Hyundai, even though its bid was 34% higher than the British bid. Id.
306. See supra text accompanying note 250.
307. See supra text accompanying note 248.
308. Gittings, supra note 99, at 1.
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been slow. Based on this issue and many others, the relation-
ship between Great Britain and China has grown acrimoni-
ous.30 9 In fact, China has even stated that Great Britain's
push to establish the Court of Final Appeal is in "breach of
the Joint Declaration."3 1 0 This reaction fosters the concern
that China can unilaterally decide that a law or policy is in
conflict with the Joint Declaration, and, via the SCNPC, abol-
ish it.
2. Link Between Hong Kong's Economic Health and
China's Continued Economic Growth
Hong Kong's links with the rest of the world are another
motivating factor in China's desire to allow Hong Kong SAR
to maintain its independence. Hong Kong has been charac-
terized as a "model of free trade." 1 ' In fact, 1992 reports
showed that Hong Kong's export share totaled approximately
$98 billion.31 2 This figure demonstrates Hong Kong's "impor-
tant position in world trade and by doing so illustrates its
value to China itself .... Anything that enhances and rein-
forces [the] key value of [Hong Kong] to China in its economic
relations with the rest of the world has to be helpful in ensur-
ing the territory's future."3 13 In fact, China admits its need
for investment in order to make the transition from a social-
ist to free market economy.314 Hong Kong already contrib-
309. Id.
310. Lok Wong, Hong Kong: Appeal Court Future 'Hangs on Agreement', S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina
File.
311. Ian K Perkin, Study Ranks HKas a Model of Free Trade, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File. The
article discusses a study done by Japan's Ministry for International Trade and
Industry. The assessment is that "Hong Kong [is a] model of free trade, and
rarely employ[s] the kinds of policies or measures that could be regarded as
unfair in the context of the GATT or other international agreements, except
some problems in enforcing effective protection for intellectual property rights."
Id.
312. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 174.
313. Ian Perkin, HKs Climb in Export Table Reflects Greater China Role,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws
File. See also Kevin Murphy, Hong Kong Remains a Target for U.S. Funds,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws
File (comparing U.S. investment in Hong Kong which totaled $6.43 billion, and
U.S. investment in Japan which totaled $22 billion).
314. Duncan Hughes, Completing the Jigsaw, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File. For instance, Beijing
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utes heavily to the financing of China's economic
expansion. 16
In addition to China's need to keep Hong Kong safe in
order to advance foreign investment interests, China has
other interests in maintaining Hong Kong's status.
One interest is utilizing Hong Kong as a link to other
ports with which China has a strained relationship, 16 such
as Malaysia, the Philippines, and, most significantly, Tai-
wan. 31 7 China also relies on Hong Kong as a source for pro-
fessionals and a way to limit contact between countries whose
political ideologies are incompatible with China's. Addition-
ally, China depends on Hong Kong for information on techno-
logical improvement and for access to those technologies.
Thus, a significant value can be placed on Hong Kong's stand-
ing as a neutral trade link between China and other
countries. 318
As China continues to open its ports to direct trade, how-
ever, its dependence on Hong Kong could potentially dimin-
ish. Conversely, Hong Kong depends heavily on China for
everyday supplies, 319 and it relies on China as an export mar-
ket, since Hong Kong's own market is limited by population
size.
While China may not yet be willing to completely move
into a free market economy, it certainly recognizes the neces-
sity of maintaining Hong Kong as a free market in order to
maintain Hong Kong's economic success. This realization,
combined with the knowledge that Hong Kong's economic,
political, and social health effects China's ability to grow eco-
has indicated that it will need well over $400 billion in the next 10 to 15 years
to rebuild and repair infrastructure. Id.
315. Caspar Weinberger, Commentary; On Evenly at Home and Abroad,
FORBES, Jan. 2, 1995, at 33. Hong Kong has played an especially important
part in financing south China's development. Id. China also needs Hong Kong
for its expertise in how to raise and manage the capital necessary for China's
expansion. Id.
316. KELLY, supra note 5, at 103.
317. Id. See discussion infra part IV.B.3. Trade between China and Taiwan
via Hong Kong totals $1 billion annually. JULIAN WEISS, THE ASIAN CENTURY
172-73 (1989).
318. Hong Kong remains the preferred location for Western corporations
looking to coordinate Chinese business. Barnathan, supra note 299, at 154.
319. KELLY, supra note 5, at 103.
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nomically, will heavily influence China's policymaking re-
garding the "one country-two systems" framework. 2 °
One example of China's reliance on Hong Kong for its
well-being is the enormous amount of Chinese investment in
Hong Kong, and vice versa.3 2 ' If China were to breach the
terms of the Joint Declaration or Basic Law by asserting too
much control with respect to trade, it would seriously jeop-
ardize or freeze the foreign investment upon which both
countries rely heavily for their prosperity. 22
China's status regarding its GATT membership may be
affected by its adherence to the Joint Declaration. If China
does not show its ability to comply with the treaties it signs,
that could potentially slow or halt its application.
3. Taiwan Reunification
China also has an interest in keeping Hong Kong in the
"one country-two system" operative because of its goal to re-
unify with Taiwan. 23 Taiwan is keeping a close watch on
China as 1997 grows closer. 24 It has already noted China's
320. For example, most of China's exports flow through Hong Kong's ports,
so it is important that China not interfere with the functioning of these ports.
321. In 1992, Chinese investment in Hong Kong totaled $13 billion. Jesus
Sanchez, International Business: Spotlight on Hong Kong; A Fading Crown
Jewel?; Uncertainties Abound as Power Transfer Nears, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1994, at D1. In addition, mainland Chinese have invested $15-25 billion in
Hong Kong. Richburg, supra note 299, at 1.
322. There is a correlation between Chinese moves and confidence in Hong
Kong. See supra part 1V.B.3. Currently, in a quest to find some security, about
half of the 528 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange have
changed their legal place of business to Bermuda. Louis Kraar, The Death of
Hong Kong, FORTUNE, June 26, 1995, at 1.
323. However, Taiwan is unlikely to return to rule under China at all.
Although certain political forces in Taiwan are not opposed to reunification with
China, most economists and politicos believe that Taiwan will refuse to seri-
ously entertain this possibility. The reasoning behind this apprehension is that
Taiwan fears economic stagnation at a time when the rest of the world is ready
to invest heavily in the Pacific Rim. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44, at 137. Taiwan continues to ally itself with
American military power, especially in recent months, because it has observed
China's increasing military activity off the Taiwanese coast. Patrick E. Tyler,
Risk of War Sharpens as Taiwan and China Spar, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 24,
1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
324. Maggie Farley, Next Step; Taiwanese Worried over Hong Kong; China's
Heavy-Handed Treatment of the British Colony Is Seen as a Warning Against
Dreams of Unity, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at H2.
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"increasingly heavy-handed" treatment of the territory with
respect to economic issues. 25
Taiwan publicly espouses the intention to reunify with
China, but only on its own terms. It rejects the "one country-
two systems" formula because it believes that Beijing will
prevail in any dispute despite the safeguards built into the
Joint Declaration and Basic Law.326 Taiwan also considers
itself different from Hong Kong because Hong Kong is a col-
ony and Taiwan is a sovereign state. 27 It is therefore un-
clear to what degree the success or failure of the Hong Kong
system will affect reunification efforts. Notwithstanding Tai-
wan's open rejection of the "one country-two systems"
formula, it seems apparent that China's adherence to that
system would help build confidence that China will do what it
says it will.
China also has an incentive to maintain Hong Kong be-
cause Hong Kong serves as the "main conduit for Taiwan-
China trade and investment flows." 328 China has stated that
Taiwanese trade will indeed be regulated by Hong Kong
Law. 329
If reunification occurs, the triad would create the world's
second largest economy3 3 0
4. Resilience and Strength of Common Law System
Common law is the primary source of law throughout the
world and has not been effectively replaced by any other sys-
325. Id. Taiwan cites examples of economic interference including obstruc-
tion of Hong Kong's renewal of commercial air service agreements between
Hong Kong and Taiwan, and an agreement which would have allowed
Taiwanese investors to trade on the Hong Kong futures market. Id. The
Taiwanese are bitter towards China because of its willingness to allow Taiwan
to invest in China, while China perpetuates an acrimonious social relationship.
Id. One example of the political interference Taiwan cites is when China at-
tempted to halt the celebration of Taiwanese Founding Day in Hong Kong. Id.
China was unsuccessful on that particular day, but the Taiwanese are not opti-
mistic given that a later celebration was ultimately canceled by Hong Kong. Id.
326. Keith Richburg, Hong Kong Formula Falls Flat in Taiwan, IN'L HER-
ALD TRn., June 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
327. Id.
328. Kevin Murphy, Beijing Opts for the Status Quo on Hong Kong-Taiwan
Ties, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Curnws File.
329. Id.
330. Farley, supra note 324, at H2. The United States is number one. Id.
Figures from 1993 put this output at about $3.2 trillion. Id.
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tern of law.331 Hong Kong's judges and lawyers are educated
under the common law system.3 32 Because China depends on
Hong Kong for development, it would want to preserve Hong
Kong's educational system in order to solidify its own devel-
opment and growth. Common law is also the source of law
utilized and understood by many countries with which Hong
Kong shares economic ties. This relationship is another pri-
mary reason for China's interest in resumption of sovereignty
over Hong Kong.
C. Problems with the Legal Consistency Between Basic
Law and the Chinese Constitution
Another fundamental conflict exists between Basic Law
and the Chinese Constitution. While the Chinese Constitu-
tion provides for the establishment of special administrative
regions, it does not specify that these SARs can run under
capitalistic governments. Thus, since the preamble of the
Chinese Constitution espouses a government run under
Party leadership, and since Basic Law requires consistency
with the Constitution, it seems that Hong Kong could possi-
bly never be autonomous.
China could therefore amend its constitution in order to
ensure that the Hong Kong capitalist system can exist
notwithstanding the Constitutional provision for Party lead-
ership. 333 China, however, refuses to even discuss the possi-
bility of amending its Constitution to provide for more spe-
cific guarantees. 3 4  Without such an amendment, it is
virtually assured that from the onset of Chinese control in
1997, any kind of reinterpretation of Hong Kong's present
laws is possible.
331. Professor Peter Wesley-Smith, Address at the University of Hong Kong
(June 21, 1994).
332. Id.
333. HUNGDAH CHIU, HONG KONG'S TRANSITION TO 1997: BACKGROUND,
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (WITH DOCUMENTS) 10 (1993). The Chinese Consti-
tution provides for the establishment of special administrative regions "when
necessary." P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, art. 31. Article 31 also indicates that the law
of such regions will be enacted by the NPC "in light of specific conditions."
CHIu, supra, at 9. The ambiguity of this provision gives the NPC a great deal of
flexibility in creating law for such special regions.
334. CHIu, supra note 333, at 10.
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D. Hong Kong, China, and GATT
One of the main problems involved in enforcing GATT
rulings is the degree to which the rules are actually followed
by the member countries.3 3 5 Compliance with GATT rulings
is heavily influenced by the domestic rules operating within
the member countries. 3 6 Herein lies the problem with China
and Hong Kong.
Because Hong Kong SAR and China have such enormous
potential for, and likelihood of, conflicts with domestic pol-
icy,3 37 can Hong Kong hope to operate effectively as a member
nation of WTO while operating under China's watchful eye?
If one were to venture through the quagmire of legislative,
judicial, executive, and political entanglements, one begins to
see that American businesses could face dire consequences
with respect to their investments in either country should
China decide not to adhere to the Joint Declaration and Basic
Law. China's relationship with GATT is therefore a crucial
point which must be resolved.
1. Hong Kong SAR as an Independent Member of
GATT
As discussed above, Hong Kong will remain a separate
member of GATT as Hong Kong SAR. 8  China will be at a
considerable disadvantage if it chooses not to comply with the
Joint Declaration by not allowing Hong Kong SAR to operate
as an SAR and as an independent member nation of GATT.33 9
The reality of this assertion can be seen with respect to Hong
Kong's links with the rest of the world.3 40 However, the con-
sequences of noncompliance, while appearing to be both polit-
ically and economically driven, are in fact purely economi-
cally driven. Thus, the United States might have more to
lose if it is forced to deal with China should China decide not
grant Hong Kong the autonomy prescribed by the Joint Dec-
laration and Basic Law.
335. PETERSMANN & HILF, supra note 164, at 37.
336. Id. at 38.
337. See supra part V.A.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
339. See discussion supra part II.E.2.
340. See discussion supra part 1V.B.2.
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2. China's Need to Become a Member of GATT/WTO
Why does China need GATT? Quite simply, as China's
economy grows more export dominated, it needs wider access
to foreign markets.
a. What Can Happen if China Is Not Granted
Membership?
The United States has a great deal to lose if China does
not become a member of GATT. It currently has approxi-
mately $5 billion invested in Hong Kong,34' and it is a party
to more than eighty-five multilateral treaties and agreements
with Hong Kong. 42 These statistics indicate that the United
States cannot live without Hong Kong as a focal point for
trade.
The United States' continued good relationship with
China is essential in order to maintain a good relationship
with Hong Kong and to ensure its own economic growth. A
disappearing trade relationship with China could have grave
consequences for the United States' economy. Indeed, one
study showed that if the United States did not invest in
China, "the Japanese, the French, the Germans and the
Latin Americans would capture the Chinese markets within
24 months and [the United States] would probably lose those
markets for the next decade or 20 years."3 43
The United States' refusal to support and facilitate
China's membership in GATT could also cause China to take
more control over Hong Kong's trade policies with the United
States. China could choose to utilize the "foreign affairs"
clause to make unfavorable decisions regarding agreements
between Hong Kong SAR and the United States.34 4 This
341. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 186.
342. Id.
343. Robert Matsui, The Price Tag for Advancing Human Rights, RECORDER,
Summer 1994, at 6. In fact, if the United States had cut off Most Favored Na-
tion status to China in 1994, conservative estimates show that the United
States would have lost 250,000 jobs in the first two months, and would have
added $15 billion to the cost of goods consumed by the low and middle income
population of the United States. Id. To show the absolute necessity of China's
trade with the United States, it is worth mentioning that "the Chinese and In-
donesians combined will need $1 trillion worth of infrastructure over the next
10 years. That is equivalent to building 18 Santa Monica Freeways per day."
Id. (emphasis added).
344. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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could result in China's refusing to let Hong Kong adhere to a
WTO ruling by asserting its power to regulate foreign affairs,
declaring the judgment in contravention of Basic Law, and
leaving American businesses powerless and without a rem-
edy on the world trading market.
China believes that its inability to gain GATT member-
ship will "not affect economic cooperation with other coun-
tries or development of foreign trade."3 45 However, current
United States-China trade disputes could affect Chinese pol-
icy towards Hong Kong SAR indirectly. China could make
business dealings between Hong Kong SAR and United
States difficult if it felt that the United States was unduly
keeping it from entering GATT. It is therefore even more im-
perative that the United States facilitate China's entry into
GATT.
b. What Would Happen if China Is Granted
GATT Membership ?346
Granting GATT membership would facilitate access for
United States businesses to China and would ease the rela-
tionship between the United States and Hong Kong SAR.
Not only would market access be available, but so too would
the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. Presently,
China is not bound by any kind of international treaty to fol-
low judicial decisions of an international body.
3. Would China Adhere to GATT?
a. Dispute Settlement
Since China needs GATT, it is likely to make a good ef-
fort to adhere to GATT principles. It could, however, assert
in the face of challenges by member countries that the WTO
has no actual power to adjudicate a dispute or enforce a set-
tlement. This has always been a problem with GATT. Again,
that is why it is important to examine a country's domestic
law and enforcement policies in assessing membership which
essentially requires self-policing, as GATT does. "GATT law"
345. China: WTO Setback Won't Hurt Trade, AS&N WALL STREET J. WKLY.,
Jan. 2, 1995, at A8.
346. It is estimated that GATT membership is worth approximately $40
billion to China. Hong Kong Officials Concerned over Growing U.S.-China
Tensions, Daily Report for Executives, Feb. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, Curnws File.
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appears to have no constitutional source, as opposed to do-
mestic law. 4 v This lack of derivation creates an atmosphere
in which some countries may feel that GATT is an informal
agreement.3 48  Given the heavy foreign investment in it,
China could also potentially never be punished for breaking
GATT rules, thus perpetuating nonenforcement problems.
GATT requires that member countries allow certain dis-
putes to be adjudicated by its dispute settlement mecha-
nisms.3 49 However, China currently refuses to even recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the International Court in the Hague,
the primary source of dispute settlement between coun-
tries.35 ° If this continues to be the case, the question remains
whether China would recognize the jurisdiction of the newly
created.WTO mechanism for settlement of disputes.
b. Transparency Requirement
With China continuing to hold tight control over individ-
ual freedoms, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which
the transparency requirement will be fulfilled, even if a writ-
ten set of laws obtains approval from the committee oversee-
ing China's application for membership. Because GATT's
transparency requirement seeks to make trade rules publicly
available to all member countries, this goal may cause China
to sway on the issue of transparency. Transparency for
China is equivalent to a loss of control.
Civil and common law offers the "concept of a legal right
as a legitimate demand for state enforcement of a legal
rule."3 5 1 By stark contrast, socialist systems have little use
for legal rights, since they are based on control by political
authority.352 Since a socialist system has more interest on
the underlying goal of the system than the preservation of an
individual interest, the possibility of China's fulfilling an obli-
gation to construct such a system, much less adhere to it,
347. Id.
348. Id. Prior to the creation of the WTO, GATT had no binding force. The
present agreement provides that member nations recognize and adhere to judg-
ments as part of each country's responsibility of membership. WTO Charter,
supra note 177, art. II.
349. HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra note 44,
at 141.
350. Id.
351. Carver, supra note 214.
352. See supra part II.D.1.
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seems to have staggering odds. However, given China's de-
sire to join GATT, the transparency requirement may likely
be fulfilled. The outcome of this requirement depends on
where China decides to draw the line between the socialist
and market aspects of its economy.
E. Other Areas in Which China Can Affect the Operation
of Hong Kong SAR
1. Continuing Clash of Socialist Regime and
Capitalist Economy
Dominating Chinese society are the conflicting ideas of
achieving a capitalist system under an authoritative govern-
ment.3 53 China wants to increase its business practices but
continues to make restrictions on the social aspect of its soci-
ety. These two ideas are completely incompatible.3 54 How-
ever, China continues to have difficulty seeing the contradic-
tion between a liberal market and a rigid social systemA55
"Official China still sees markets and private property as in-
struments to be used to invigorate sagging socialism, not as a
desirable alternative institutionalized system."356
In fact, one can view China's failure to let go of its social
politics in order to advance its economic system as continuing
evidence of its inability to see that China is actually different
from Hong Kong. Recognizing that China's planned economy
differs from Hong Kong's free market is necessary before Chi-
nese leaders can attempt to diminish the influence of party
policy on economic policy. Indeed, China cannot see that
Hong Kong "is a profit-making machine whose outstanding
performance is the result of a very flexible posture in the face
of highly volatile economic conditions."3 57 This flexibility is,
again, totally incompatible with the rigid social structure
that frames China's government.
353. Christopher Lingle & Kurt Wickman, Is China Ready for GATT?, AsIAN
WALL ST. J. WKLY., May 12, 1994.
354. Id.
355. Weighing Hong Kong's Future, supra note 16, at 85. This article asserts
that "[wihat does matter to [China] is that [its] path of economic development
should not be diverted by the complications of democracy. Hence their obses-
sive concern with Hong Kong: it is both an economic model to be emulated and
a political threat to be avoided." Id.
356. Carver, supra note 111, at 27 (emphasis added).
357. MUSHKAT, supra note 304, at 121.
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2. Special Problems Regarding International Business
Transactions
What makes international business transactions differ-
ent from domestic business transactions is that a lawyer
must not only look at the business objective, but also observe
political forces which intervene and impact the transaction.
Foreign politics have a strong influence on the nature of the
business transaction and can often upset the fluidity of that
transaction. One must be careful to not only observe the
changes in laws and regulations in the United States, but
also the laws and regulations in the foreign country with
which one deals.35 8
3. Instability of Future Leadership as Deng Xiaopeng's
Health Declines359
Another factor that affects the climate of China-Hong
Kong relations and American business is the impending
death of Deng Xiaopeng. Deng is the ninety-one-year-old
leader who holds no official position in China, yet is credited
with the transformation of the country towards a free market
economy.3 60 Reports indicate that "uncertainty surrounding
Deng's health is serving to paralyze the economy."
361
What will happen upon Deng's death? President Jiang
Zemin and Premier Li Peng3 62 are slated to succeed Deng and
continue China's path to economic reform. In fact, the cur-
rent succession structure, set up by Deng, is as follows: Jiang
in place of Deng, Li Peng leading the government, and Zhu
358. OSCAR SCHACHTER & ROBERT HELLAWELL, COMPETITION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS 13 (1981).
359. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
360. James Pringle, China Holds Its Breath in Death-Watch, S.F. EXAMINER,
Jan. 14, 1995, at A3. Deng Xiaopeng "has been the chief architect of the coun-
try's economic reform over the past 16 years and has provided the glue to hold
together different tendencies within the Communist Party while pursuing con-
tinued economic expansion combined with rigorous political control." Id. See
also Barry Naughton, Deng Xiaoping: The Economist, CHINA Q., Sept. 1993, at
491 (discussing Deng's historical contributions to China's rapid economic
growth and China's economic policy under his leadership).
361. Pringle, supra note 360, at A3.
362. Li Peng was the leader who instigated the suppression of the showing of
democracy in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Rone Tempest, Deng Death Watch
Rivets China, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 5, 1995, at A12. This quelching of free
speech seems to indicate that China is still desperately afraid of losing control
of its people. Id. Li Peng is also the leader of the Party's hard-line faction. Id.
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Rongji heading the economy.3 63 Further, Deng has put in
place his own appointees in the military to support Jiang's
succession.364 Jiang, Li, and Zhu comprise the conservative
hard-line rapid growth policy implemented by Deng.36 5 How-
ever, a power struggle seems likely because, as one Western
military observer stated, "Jiang is seen a lot like Bill Clinton.
He's obeyed because he's commander in chief, but there's not
a lot of respect."366 In addition, the rapidly changing econ-
omy, the move towards a free market economy, and the pend-
ing cession of Hong Kong make a power struggle between so-
cialist and capitalist figures likely because the transfer of
political power is not institutionalized. 6 7 This power strug-
gle could seriously damage American interests in both Hong
Kong and China.368 Whoever succeeds Deng must continue
on China's path of economic reform so that investors can rely
on at least a status quo of Chinese law. Continuing to do so
will stabilize confidence in Hong Kong's markets and will al-
low foreign investment to continue on the same path.3 69
The inability of Deng's successors to stay in power could
interfere with Hong Kong's "one country-two systems" ar-
rangement created by Deng. Confidence in China's smooth
succession is strongly tied to confidence that Hong Kong can
remain autonomous. 7 °
363. Joyce Barnathan et al., China After Deng, Bus. WE., Feb. 6, 1995, at 52.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. For a more complete analysis regarding various leaders who are
likely to vie for power once Deng passes, see id.
367. Lok Wong, China; Analysts Consider Aftermath of Chen's Death, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Schina File.
368. In addition to this struggle between Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, there is
also the possibility that the entire power struggle could involve Zhu Rongji, the
head of economic reform, and Qiao Shi, the current leader of the NPC. Moffett,
supra note 119, at A6.
369. Deng's pending death and the instability of successive power have al-
ready cost China some foreign investment. Because of the string of permits and
levels of approval foreign investors must endure to participate in China's
growth, indecisiveness and uneasiness have created a lack of confidence that
permission will be secured following Deng's death. The holdups are also proba-
bly a result of Deng's lack of leadership due to his illness and already signal the
potential for problems.
370. Deng has always "intervened and argued for a more strategic coopera-
tion with the United States as integral to the long term development of the
economy." Keith Richburg, At 91, Deng Still Casts a Political Shadow, Poten-
tial Challengers for Leadership Wait Quietly in Wings, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug.
23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File. Again, any changes
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4. Cultural Differences
Communication between Chinese and American busi-
nessmen is often difficult because of different cultural
norms.3 7 1 For example, in the United States the common ap-
proach of addressing a difficulty "head-on" often leads to the
Chinese businessmen "losing face," which hampers resolution
of business conflicts. Another problem is the language bar-
rier. Still another pervasive problem is China's slow under-
taking of formal business procedures such as holding weekly
meetings, instituting budgets and progress guidelines, and
clarifying officers' duties.372 Chinese businessmen tend to
emphasize sustaining relationships whereas American busi-
nessmen immediately want to reach agreement on the terms
of business dealings.3 73
Another important difference has to do with the legal
systems in place. China views contractual disagreements as
cultural matters, which means that they are resolved
through "friendly discussions."374 In the United States, law
is an ally to right wrongs, whereas in Asia the view is that
one has not met the "standard of trying to maintain har-
mony" if the dispute is taken to court. 75 In Asia, the last
step one takes is threatening or filing a lawsuit.3 76
This also means that because contracts are rarely adjudi-
cated in the courtroom, and because legal decisions carry no
precedential value, contracts are essentially formally unen-
forceable through the Chinese legal system. 7 v This scenario
in attitude towards the United States could affect Hong Kong's policy towards
the United States following cession in 1997.
371. Jill Ireland, Finding the Right Management Approach, CHINA Bus.
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 14.
372. Id. at 15.
373. See id.
The American way [of doing business] is, "Hey, it's costing us $5,000 to
$6,000 to send you on this trip, you'd better get the business." The
Asian idea is, "We're 2,000 years old, and we want to build a relation-
ship and learn all about you and all about your facilities."
CHRISTOPHER ENGHOLM, DOING BUSINESS IN ASIA's BOOMING "CHINA TRIANGLE"
70 (1994).
374. John J. Hampton, China: Managing Risks in Chinese Joint Ventures,
RISK MGMT., Apr. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
375. Larry L. Greewald, Resolution in Asia, ASIA L. & PRAc., Nov. 26, 1994,
at 4-5.
376. Id.
377. An example of this is China's recent decision to default on a 20 year
lease with McDonald's regarding its Beijing cite. Sarah McAdams, It Is Not
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makes entering contracts very precarious for foreign
investors.
F. Special Problems for the Small Individual Investor
So far, this comment has focused on the world market,
and has been somewhat generally geared towards the
problems of the United States as a whole. However, it is
worth examining what might happen to small or individual
traders or investors.
Small investors face different problems on the world
market. Because each move made has an immediate eco-
nomic consequence, it is crucial that they are able to plan ac-
cording to a consistent set of rules. As has been shown above,
that has been problematic for China in the past, and may be
in the future given the inconsistencies between Basic Law
and the Chinese Constitution.
378
In addition, the length of time it takes for businesses to
be granted status to do business in China hits small busi-
nesses disproportionately hard, because they generally have
insufficient or significantly fewer resources to expedite the
process. Moreover, most GATT trade disputes are brought by
the United States on behalf of large businesses or industries,
where the government chooses or is compelled to intervene on
their behalf.3 79 Thus, often there is no remedy for the small
investor when disputes occur.
Business as Usual for Lawyers in China; Legal Restrictions Are Yet Another
Barrier to U.S. Companies, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1995, at 11. Despite its
protests, McDonald's had no choice but to close the restaurant in the face of
China's decision that the development of a $1.2 billion commercial, office, and
residential complex on that particular property was a better economic decision
for China. Id.
378. See supra parts IV.A, 1V.E.
379. Large investors were in fact a main reason President Clinton chose to
renew China's MFN status.
Even if [President Clinton] had wanted to [deny renewal of MFN sta-
tus], Congress would probably not have let him do so. For many
lawmakers had been listening to what the President had to say. So
had the American Chamber of Commerce. So had the U.S.-China
Business Council, Boeing, AT&T, K-Mart, and millions of Americans
who invested money in mutual funds that were buying up stocks in
Shanghai and Hong Kong by the billions.
Thomas L. Friedman, Economy Wins over Rights as Clinton Eats a Little Crow,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 28, 1994 (emphasis added), available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Curnws File. Smaller investors do not have the same voice or
economic power as larger investors.
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Lastly, corruption is a continuing problem in the Chinese
economy, currently adding five to ten percent to the cost of
doing business with China. ° If this extends into Hong Kong
in 1997, then small businesses and start-up ventures will suf-
fer. They will likely be unable to pay those added costs to
protect their interests and their growth will be stymied, if not
halted. The pervasiveness of corruption in Hong Kong could
be a great contributor to the downturn of Hong Kong courts
as arbitrators of disputes and crimes, thus eliminating their
legitimacy. The effect of this will be to create a path towards
Hong Kong's decline as a favorable place to do business.
V. PROPOSALS
The remainder of this.comment offers possible solutions
to the larger problems elicited above.
First, it is necessary to make some basic assumptions
upon which to base these proposals. The first assumption is
that Hong Kong should continue to remain a capitalist econ-
omy. Second, one must realize that these proposals are not
entirely legally based. The proposed solutions are legal solu-
tions, but in this instance the United States only has lever-
age, not legal power, to impose any of these proposals. There-
fore, while the effect of these proposals are legal, they are
policy oriented and rely on the interactions between Hong
Kong, China, and the United States with respect to economic,
not legal, power. This comment suggests that the United
States emphasize its position as the head of the committee
overseeing China's WTO membership application. Pressure
exerted under such conditions would then be viewed in the
context that China does not have support for WTO member-
ship, thus making it economically weaker. Perhaps then
China will make reasonable efforts to resolve conflicts in the
transition.
A. Increase United States Pressure on Hong Kong to Make
Demands Now Rather than Waiting Until 1997
While the United States invariably needs China because
of its immense new market, the United States still has a
great deal of leverage. Showing support for the maintenance
380. Maggie Farley, China Makes Itself at Home in Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES,
May 2, 1995, at Hi.
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of Hong Kong as an SAR would likely strengthen Hong
Kong's bargaining position with respect to transition rules
currently being negotiated. There are several areas in which
the United States should direct its influence.
1. Separation of Powers
Basic Law needs to be amended to provide for a more in-
dependent Hong Kong SAR. This can be accomplished with-
out China diminishing its sovereign power over Hong Kong,
by simply providing that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong
not be an officer appointed by China. Detaching the highest
executive officer of Hong Kong from the executive body of
China would add to the confidence that China desires to
maintain Hong Kong's status quo. This detachment would
also give the appearance of removing the Party influence on
Hong Kong SAR. In addition, it could have the effect of mak-
ing China treat Hong Kong as an autonomous country. This
move might enhance the chances of achieving the high degree
of autonomy prescribed in the Joint Declaration.
The United States could assist in this venture by also
urging China to consider that detaching the Chief Executive
from the NPC would not diminish the role of the NPC in prac-
tice. That is, if China continued to reserve the power vested
in NPC for final determination of whether enacted laws or
negotiated treaties were consistent with Basic Law, it would
effectively have the same power. Separating the powers
would be an important step because it would show that China
was moving towards easing bureaucratic control.
The best way for China to demonstrate that it intends to
preserve Hong Kong as it is would be to allow the Chief Exec-
utive to be directly elected by the people of Hong Kong SAR.
Democratic elections are one of the key structures in capital-
istic economies. If Hong Kong could institute direct election
of the Chief Executive, this move could potentially insulate
Hong Kong SAR from the more informal and arbitrary Chi-
nese Government. In addition, it could aid Hong Kong in re-
taining many people who might leave, based on their feeling
that they no longer have a say in the direction their country
is going.
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2. Pressure Hong Kong to Ask that Specific Provisions
of Basic Law and the Joint Declaration Be
Integrated into a Constitution to Create a
Better Source of Law
If Hong Kong were able to retain its capitalistic charac-
teristics by incorporating most of the essential points into a
constitutional guarantee, there would likely be more confi-
dence in Hong Kong's future. China might even be less likely
to interfere with such a source of law, with the whole world
watching.
The problem with this proposal, of course, is China's like-
lihood of allowing it to occur. However, since many of the eco-
nomic demands that this comment proposes are also GATT
demands, pressure to implement them could be successful.
For instance, issues such as continued convertibility of cur-
rency, land ownership interests, and equal treatment of for-
eign and domestic investment, if constitutionally based,
would serve to provide a more grounded source of law. The
result of this would be to reduce the possibility that China
could operate under its own interests and subvert these key
factors in free trade.
3. Pressure Hong Kong to Issue Its Own Policy
Regarding the Status of International Treaties
Entered into Prior to 1997
Because much of the United States' concern lies in
whether or not treaties will be honored past 1997, it would be
beneficial for the United States to pressure Hong Kong to is-
sue a policy regarding how it plans to honor or renegotiate
those treaties. Indeed, the United States issued its own pol-
icy act regarding American treatment of bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties between it and Hong Kong. 81
If Hong Kong issued its own statement that it would sim-
ilarly honor the treaties and agreements entered into prior to
1997, such a statement would force China to answer ques-
tions regarding its intention to interfere with such matters.
This would allow United States businesses to at least get a
better idea of the direction China will take in 1997; It would
also facilitate planning regarding not only how to do business
in Hong Kong or China, but whether to do so at all. The for-
381. See supra part II.F.
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mer option would be especially valuable for smaller investors
who face more dire economic circumstances should their busi-
nesses fail under a hostile political climate.382
4. Pressure Hong Kong to Amend the Chinese
Constitution to Provide for the Functioning of a
Capitalistic Economy Under the
Sovereignty of a Socialist Government
To assure the continued existence of Hong Kong as an
SAR, the United States could pressure Hong Kong into de-
manding the amendment of article 31 of the Chinese Consti-
tution to provide for the fumctioning of a capitalist economy
as a special administrative region. This clause would give
the world further assurance that economic interests will not
be subverted in the face of political controversies on the
mainland.3 83
5. Pressure Hong Kong to State a Policy Regarding
Party Presence in Hong Kong After 1997
Because the Communist Party is a totally pervasive pres-
ence in China, it is important for Hong Kong to understand
exactly what role China will play in Hong Kong. The influ-
ence of the Party in all branches of Chinese Government is
likely to affect Hong Kong's ability to rule itself. One key
question is whether the Chief Executive38 4 will be a Party
member with real power granted to him to make the deci-
sions required under Basic Law, or whether he will need to
defer to the party for final decision-making power. In addi-
tion, will other officials appointed to assist Hong Kong in its
transition be Party figures? To what extent will China en-
sure that officials appointed share Party views? Exactly to
what extent will such leaders be "required" to subscribe to
Party policy?
Whatever presence China intends the Party to have,
Hong Kong needs to be informed prior to 1997. If the deci-
sion-making power will be held by the Party, then the law
will be what the Party says it is. This would bear heavily on
Hong Kong's ability to maintain its current economic and so-
cial policy.
382. See supra part IV.F.
383. See supra part W.C.
384. See supra part II.C.1.
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B. Pressure China to Defer to a Third Party for Purposes
of Determining Consistency Between Hong Kong
Law and Basic Law
An amendment to Basic Law which provides for defer-
ence to a third party in order to determine consistency be-
tween Hong Kong law and Basic Law would ease the 1997
transition concerns the United States has. If there were a
third-party panel, or if China would agree to subject itself tojurisdiction of an international court, the resulting confidence
would definitely aid all concerned.
Not only would United States businesses become more
inclined to invest with confidence, but there would also be lit-
tle doubt that Hong Kong would have less of a problem re-
taining major investors who are tentative about 1997. If a
third party adjudicated disputes, rather than the sovereign
government, most subjectivity would disappear and the
world's interests, and particularly Hong Kong's, would not be
subverted by Chinese Communist Party interests.
This type of adjudication would also aid China because it
would lead China down the path to capitalism and free trade.
China would have less difficulty seeing Hong Kong's neces-
sity to remain free from the boundaries of government in or-
der to maintain its economic prosperity. Since Hong Kong's
economic prosperity is China's economic prosperity, this
would likely create a stronger union, rather than create a
more tenuous one. Third-party adjudication would be a "win-
win" situation for China, Hong Kong, and the United States.
C. Pressure China to Maintain Hong Kong's Status Quo
Via WTO Entry
Because the United States wields considerable power
with respect to China's entry into the WTO, it can pressure
China to accept and adhere to the constraints of interdepen-
dence which are the pillars of WTO membership by using
Hong Kong as a measure of its sincerity to do so. The United
States could take a silent seat and watch to see whether
China will adhere to the Joint Declaration, but it would be
more beneficial to form a strategy of dealing with China that
encourages its adherence to the Joint Declaration. Such
pressure would also facilitate China's entrance into the WTO.
In fact, it might even be more prudent to offer China incen-
tives to comply with its promises regarding Hong Kong, con-
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sidering the enormous interest the United States has in pre-
serving Hong Kong and advancing China's growth.
Incentives could include educating China on the reasons why
Hong Kong is valuable. As China itself has conceded, "[If
you don't understand something, you are unaware of what
makes it valuable, and it will be difficult to keep it intact.""s '
The United States must also be prepared to formulate a
strategy to deal with China's coastal regions, such as
Shenzhen, in the event that China becomes fragmented, or
the move toward economic growth continues to favor the
more independent coastal regions.
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been vast speculation regarding Hong Kong's
future as 1997 grows nearer. What effect will its cession to
China have on international trade? Ultimately, no matter
what preparation or speculation takes place, there is no way
to approach 1997 without caution. The world must simply
wait to see what will occur. Indeed, it has been said that
Hong Kong's fate will be determined by which proves
more powerful: the advantages of being the principle
business and financial entrepot between China and the
rest of the world, or the damage done to the territory's so-
phisticated social and economic fabric by being combined
with the coarser weave of China.3 8 6
Elizabeth A.R. Yee
385. Kraar, supra note 322, at 118. Outside observers have maintained that
"No one thinks the Chinese will decide to kill the goose, but there is considera-
ble concern about whether they know what to do to keep it alive." David Zeeck,
China Saw Hong Kong in New Light After Tiananmen, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
386. It's Already 1997 in Hong Kong, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1993, at 26.
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